"God who answered Hanania, Misha'el, and Azaraih will answer us"

In honor of Ellul. (I was putting off this post until I got back into my Spertus subscription and aded the Hebrew sources, but I'm going to put that on hold for the moment with the intention to post updates, ("beli neder").)

The following derashah is my translation of a short essay by R. Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg (aka "Seridei Eish") which can be found in the collection of his work called "Li-ferakim."

TB Pesahim 53b:
This also explicated Todos man of Rome: What did Hanania Mishael and Azariah see that they gave themselves over for the sanctification of the Name? They reasoned a fortiori about themselves from frogs: If frogs, who are not commanded regarding sanctification of the name, it is written about them "and they will come upon you (Egypt) in your houses...and in your ovens and in your kneading troughs" {when are kenading troughs found near the oven? - at the time when the oven is hot}, then we, who are commanded regarding sanctification of the name, how much more so.

The Rishonim and Aharonim have already dealt with this Baraita - see Rashi, Tosafot, and Maharsha.

And that which appears to me to explain the sequence of ideas in this Baraita: Rabenu Tam has already explained that the image which Nevuchadnezzar made was not a real idol. Rather, he made a statue for the glory of the king, and in such a case we do not say "[you must remain loyal to God's commandments] even if He takes your life." So, if Hanania et al had asked a question in the house of study, [the rabbis] would have permitted them to transgress and not be killed. And this is the question of Todos man of Rome, "what did they see, etc...?": Why did they not behave like the rest of the people of their generation, who would bow to the statue and were saved?

And to this he answers: They reasoned an a fortiori argument... The intention is not to an "a fortiori" argument in the logical, legal sense, for [if so] this [argument] is broken (ie, illogical) from many sides, as the explicators have already gone on at length and have had difficulty settling [the issue]. Rather, its intention is to the mode of association and analogy. This "a fortiori" was said by way of (ha'avarah and hash'alah - implication?), by way of a metaphor only. Todos, man of Rome, hints with this to the primal inner strength that breaks out (boke'a) and rises in the soul, and bursts in a person, at the time of action, from the hiddenness of its depth beyond the boundary of perception and clear knowledge, and operates and pushes its master, and forces upon him a particular way of acting without becoming concerned with the letter of the law (shurat ha-din) and that which is optional and mandatory. - Just as the frogs in Egypt, who were not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name, for behold commandments and free will are irrelevant to them, rather everything they do comes from the strength of the nartural-divine law that is imprinted (tavua) in them from the six days of creation. And similarly, that which they would do in Egypt, they were not acting of their own knowledge, but rather with the force of an internal rule that pushed them, and its (shahar-?) they did not know. And once they saw a flaming oven, they did not first stand and consider for themselves how far is the boundary of the commandment and where the optional realm takes over, rather they jumped into it without any hesitation or reservation, and they were burned alive joyous and happy to do the will of their maker which He worked into them. A single and undivided will filled them, whether in their subordination to the tasks of their natural lives until the hour of wonder, whether at the hour they went out to fulfill a miraculous mission and to make known in the world also from this perspective their sender, their leader, and their supporter (mekhalkelam).

And see what they said in the midrash (Sh"R 33, 5): Rabi Yosi said, Pinchas explicated regarding himself: If a horse gives its life for the day of battle - even if he dies he gives his life for his master - then I, for the sanctification of the name of the KBH, how much more so!

However, experience teaches that the spiritual reaction that is not preceded by questioning or advice, takes an important place in individual and communal life. And sometimes, it decides the destiny of entire nations and movements, whether to the rod or to lovingkindness - its power is not greater with the large things than regarding the small. She has her own ethical realm (? - reshut) and logic. She does not consider/deal with (mithashevet) the regular letter of the law, nor with measuring sticks (tools) readily available for the benefit of the individual and community. This we also learn from the lives of the great religious personalities. Hanania Mishael and Azariah serve as an example of this.

First, a discourse on jumping into fires al kiddush haShem is uncanny in retrospect. (RYYW survived a number of concentration camps.) Of course, the haredi reprinting of Li-ferakim which I own doesn't have dates for most of the derashot. (This is especially annoying since if I recall correctly dates do appear for most essays in the original version. I haven't made it to the JTS library to check, though...) But basically everything in the book was written in the 30s.

Second, I think ideas like this are really important given the obsession with "halakhic man" I encountered for much of my life. Acc to RYYW, it seems, sometimes the "Torah" way to act is from true religious impulse, oblivious to halakha.

Once I'm spinning it that way, though, I have to note that he's talking only about one sort of religious impulse, which has to do with death. In principle, once halakhah is not the last criterion in one area it should lose it's status in others. But, for some reason it's easier to say kill yourself in violation of halakhah than some much more mundane things. My first thought is that this has to do with ascertaining motives: perhaps it's easier to untangle a truly "religious" motive from other strong urges that may masquerade as religious when one's life is on the line. That is, for most people, valorizing a violation of halakhah in martyrdom doesn't license something they want to do anyway for other reasons... Alternatively, perhaps halakhah is the province of details. The less fundamental something is, the greater the presumption that a true religiou impulse follows halakhah. But, halakhah alone can't "fit" momentous religious moments, which require the totality of the religious personality to encounter them?